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De ente et essentia

On being and essence

Chapter 2

In substantiis igitur compositis forma et materia nota est, ut in homine anima et corpus. Non autem potest dici quod alterum eorum tantum essentia esse dicatur. Quod enim materia sola non sit essentia rei planum est, quia res per essentiam suam et cognoscibilis est et in specie ordinatur vel genere. Sed materia neque cognitionis principium est, neque secundum eam aliquid ad genus vel speciem determinatur, sed secundum id quod aliquid actu est. Neque etiam forma tantum essentia substantie composite dici potest, quamvis hoc quidam asserere conentur. Ex his enim que dicta sunt patet quod essentia est illud, quod per diffinitionem rei significatur. Diffinitio autem substantiarum naturalium non tantum formam continet, sed etiam materiam; aliter enim diffinitiones naturales et mathematice non differrent. Nec potest dici quod materia in diffinitione substantie naturalis ponatur sicut additum essentie eius vel ens extra essentiam eius, quia hic modus diffinitionis proprius est accidentibus, que perfectam essentiam non habent. Unde oportet quod in diffinitione sua subiectum recipiant, quod est extra genus eorum. Patet ergo quod essentia comprehendit materiam et formam.

Matter and form are found in composite things, as we find soul and body in mankind. We cannot single out one of matter and form to call essence. That material alone is not essence is clear because it is through essence that we know a thing and place it in its genus or species. But material is neither a source of knowledge, nor does matter determine the genus or species of a thing. These are determined by what the thing actually is. Nor can form alone be called the essence of a composite being, although some have tried to assert this. From what we have already said it is clear that essence is what we mean by the definition of a thing. The definition of natural things comprises matter as well as form; otherwise there would be no difference between natural and mathematical definitions. We cannot say that matter is placed in the definition of a natural substance as something added to its essence, or a being outside its essemce, since this form of definition belongs to accidents, which do not have a complete essence. The definition of accidents requires mention of their subject, which is outside their genus. From this it is clear that essence compries matter and form.

Non autem potest dici quod essentia significet relationem, que est inter materiam et formam vel aliquid superadditum ipsis, quia hoc de necessitate esset accidens et extraneum a re nec per eam res cognosceretur, que omnia essentie conveniunt. Per formam enim, que est actus materie, materia efficitur ens actu et hoc aliquid. Unde illud quod superadvenit non dat esse actu simpliciter materie, sed esse actu tale, sicut etiam accidentia faciunt, ut albedo facit actu album. Unde et quando talis forma acquiritur, non dicitur generari simpliciter, sed secundum quid.

Nor can it be said that essence means the relationship between matter and form, or anything added to them, because such an additive is of necessity accidental and extraneous to the thing; nor can the thing be known through such a relationship, yet it is a property of every essence to be the medium of knowledge. Through form, which is the act of matter, matter becomes an actual being, and a particular thing. Hence something added to matter and form does not give being as such to a thing, but merely a certain kind of being, which accidents also give, as whitenss makes something actually white. Hence when a thing acquires a certain accidental property, it is not said to come into existence totally, but in a certain way.

Relinquitur ergo quod nomen essentie in substantiis compositis significat id quod ex materia et forma compositum est. Et huic consonat verbum Boethii in commento predicamentorum, ubi dicit quod usia significat compositum. Usia enim apud grecos idem est quod essentia apud nos, ut ipsemet dicit in libro de duabus naturis. Avicenna etiam dicit quod quiditas substantiarum compositarum est ipsa compositio forme et materie. Commentator etiam dicit super VII Metaphysice: natura quam habent species in rebus generabilibus est aliquod medium, id est compositum ex materia et forma. Huic etiam ratio concordat, quia esse substantie composite non est tantum forme nec tantum materie, sed ipsius compositi. Essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur. Unde oportet quod essentia, qua res denominatur ens, non tantum sit forma neque tantum materia, sed utrumque, quamvis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sit causa. Sic enim in aliis videmus, que ex pluribus principiis constituuntur, quod res non denominatur ex altero illorum principiorum tantum, sed ab eo, quod utrumque complectitur, ut patet in saporibus, quia ex actione calidi digerentis humidum causatur dulcedo, et quamvis hoc modo calor sit causa dulcedinis, non tamen denominatur corpus dulce a calore, sed a sapore qui calidum et humidum complectitur.

The only possibility, therefore, is that the term essence, used with respect to composite substances, signifies that which is composed of matter and form. This conclusion is consistent with what Boethius says in his Commentary on the Categories, namely, that ousia signifies what is composite; ousia, of course, is for the Greeks what essence is for us, as Boethius himself says in his book De Persona et Duabus Naturis.[[3]] Avicenna even says, Metaphysicae V, cap. 5, that the quiddity of a composite substance is the very composition of the form and the matter. And commenting on Book VII of Aristotle's Metaphysicae, the Commentator says, "The nature that species in generable things have is something in the middle; that is, it is composed of matter and form." Metaphysicae VII, com. 27. Moreover, reason supports this view, for the existence of a composite substance is neither form alone nor matter alone but is rather composed of these. The essence is that according to which the thing is said to exist; hence, it is right that the essence by which a thing is denominated a being is neither form alone not matter alone but both, albeit that existence of this kind is caused by the form and not by the matter. Similarly, we see that in other things that are constituted from many principles, the thing is not denominated from just one or the other of the principles but rather from that which embraces both. Thus, with respect to flavors, sweetness is caused by the action of a warm animal body digesting what is wet, and albeit that in this way warmth is the cause of the sweetness, nevertheless a body is not called sweet by reason of the warmth, but rather by reason of the flavor, which embraces both the warmth and the wetness.

Sed quia individuationis principium materia est, ex hoc forte videtur sequi quod essentia, que materiam in se complectitur simul et formam, sit tantum particularis et non universalis. Ex quo sequeretur quod universalia diffinitionem non haberent, si essentia est id quod per diffinitionem significatur. Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non quolibet modo accepta est individuationis principium, sed solum materia signata. Et dico materiam signatam, quae sub determinatis dimensionibus consideratur. Hec autem materia in diffinitione hominis, in quantum est homo, non ponitur, sed poneretur in diffinitione socratis, si socrates diffinitionem haberet. In diffinitione autem hominis ponitur materia non signata; non enim in diffinitione hominis ponitur hoc os et hec caro, sed os et caro absolute, que sunt materia hominis non signata.

But because matter is the principle of individuation, it would perhaps seem to follow that essence, which embraces in itself simultaneously both form and matter, is merely particular and not universal. From this it would follow that universals have no definitions, assuming that essence is what is signified by the definition. Thus, we must point out that matter understood in the way we have thus far understood it is not the principle of individuation; only signate matter is the principle of individuation. I call signate matter matter considered under determinate dimensions. Signate matter is not included in the definition of man as man, but signate matter would be included in the definition of Socrates if Socrates had a definition. In the definition of man, however, is included non-signate matter: in the definition of man we do not include this bone and this flesh but only bone and flesh absolutely, which are the non-signate matter of man.

Sic ergo patet quod essentia hominis et essentia socratis non differunt nisi secundum signatum et non signatum. Unde commentator dicit super VII Metaphysice: socrates nihil aliud est quam animalitas et rationalitas, que sunt quiditas eius. Sic etiam essentia generis et speciei secundum signatum et non signatum differunt, quamvis alius modus designationis sit utrobique, quia designatio individui respectu speciei est per materiam determinatam dimensionibus, designatio autem speciei respectu generis est per differentiam constitutivam, que ex forma rei sumitur. Hec autem determinatio vel designatio, que est in specie respectu generis, non est per aliquid in essentia speciei exsistens, quod nullo modo in essentia generis sit, immo quicquid est in specie, est etiam in genere ut non determinatum. Si enim animal non esset totum quod est homo, sed pars eius, non predicaretur de eo, cum nulla pars integralis de suo toto predicetur.

Hence, the essence of man and the essence of Socrates do not differ except as the signate differs from the non-signate, and so the Commentator says, in Metaphysicae VII, com. 20, "Socrates is nothing other than animality and rationality, which are his quiddity." Similarly, the essence of a genus and the essence of a species differ as signate from non-signate, although in the case of genus and species a different mode of designation is used with respect to both. For, the designation of the individual with respect to the species is through matter determined by dimensions, while the designation of the species with respect to the genus is through the constitutive difference, which is taken from the form of the thing. This determination or designation, however, which is made in the species with respect to the genus, is not through something that exists in the essence of the species but in no way exists in the essence of the genus. On the contrary, whatever is in the species is also in the genus as undetermined. If animal were not all that man is but rather only a part of him, then animal would not be predicated of man, for no integral part is predicated of its whole.

Hoc autem quomodo contingat videri poterit, si inspiciatur qualiter differt corpus secundum quod ponitur pars animalis et secundum quod ponitur genus. Non enim potest eo modo esse genus, quo est pars integralis. Hoc igitur nomen quod est corpus multipliciter accipi potest. Corpus enim, secundum quod est in genere substantie, dicitur ex eo quod habet talem naturam, ut in eo possint designari tres dimensiones; ipse enim tres dimensiones designate sunt corpus, quod est in genere quantitatis. Contingit autem in rebus, ut quod habet unam perfectionem ad ulteriorem etiam perfectionem pertingat, sicut patet in homine, qui et naturam sensitivam habet et ulterius intellectivam. Similiter etiam et super hanc perfectionem, que est habere talem formam, ut in ea possint tres dimensiones designari, potest alia perfectio adiungi, ut vita vel aliquid huiusmodi. Potest ergo hoc nomen corpus significare rem quandam, que habet talem formam, ex qua sequitur in ipsa designabilitas trium dimensionum cum precisione, ut scilicet ex illa forma nulla ulterior perfectio sequatur; sed si quid aliud superadditur, sit preter significationem corporis sic dicti. Et hoc modo corpus erit integralis et materialis pars animalis, quia sic anima erit preter id quod significatum est nomine corporis et erit superveniens ipsi corpori, ita quod ex ipsis duobus, scilicet anima et corpore, sicut ex partibus constituetur animal.

We can see how this happens by considering how body as a part of animal differs from body as the genus of animal. In the way body is the genus of animal it cannot be an integral part of animal, and thus the term body can be accepted in several ways. Body is said to be in the genus of substance in that it has a nature such that three dimensions can be designated in the body. These three designated dimensions are the body that is in the genus of quantity. Now, it sometimes happens that what has one perfection may attain to a further perfection as well, as is clear in man, who has a sensitive nature and, further, an intellective one. Similarly, above this perfection of having a form such that three dimensions can be designated in it, there can be joined another perfection, as life or some similar thing. This term body, therefore, can signify a certain thing that has a form such that from the form there follows in the thing designatability in three dimensions and nothing more, such that, in other words, from this form no further perfection follows, but if some other thing is superadded, it is beyond the signification of body thus understood. And understood in this way, body will be an integral and material part of the animal, because in this way the soul will be beyond what is signified by the term body, and it will supervene on the body such that from these two, namely the soul and the body, the animal is constituted as from parts.

Potest etiam hoc nomen corpus hoc modo accipi, ut significet rem quandam, que habet talem formam, ex qua tres dimensiones possunt in ea designari, quecumque forma sit illa, sive ex ea possit provenire aliqua ulterior perfectio sive non. Et hoc modo corpus erit genus animalis, quia in animali nihil est accipere quod non implicite in corpore continetur. Non enim anima est alia forma ab illa, per quam in re illa poterant designari tres dimensiones; et ideo, cum dicebatur quod corpus est quod habet talem formam, ex qua possunt designari tres dimensiones in eo, intelligebatur: quecumque forma esset, sive animalitas sive lapideitas sive quecumque alia. Et sic forma animalis implicite in forma corporis continetur, prout corpus est genus eius.

This term body can also be understood as signifying a certain thing that has a form such that three dimensions can be designated in it, whatever form this may be, and such that either from the form some further perfection can proceed or not. Understood in this way, body will be the genus of animal, for there will be understood in animal nothing that is not implicitly contained in body. Now, the soul is a form through which there can be designated in the thing three dimensions, and therefore, when we say that body is what has a form from which three dimensions can be designated in the body, we understand there is some kind of form of this type, whether soul, or lapideousness, or whatever other form. And thus the form of animal is implicitly contained in the form of body, just as body is its genus.

Et talis est etiam habitudo animalis ad hominem. Si enim animal nominaret tantum rem quandam, que habet talem perfectionem, ut possit sentire et moveri per principium in ipso existens cum precisione alterius perfectionis, tunc quecumque alia perfectio ulterior superveniret, haberet se ad animal per modum partis et non sicut implicite contenta in ratione animalis, et sic animal non esset genus; sed est genus secundum quod significat rem quandam, ex cuius forma potest provenire sensus et motus, quecumque sit illa forma, sive sit anima sensibilis tantum sive sensibilis et rationalis simul.

The relation of animal to man is the same. For if animal named just a certain thing that has a perfection such that it can sense and move by a principle existing in itself, without any other perfection, then whatever further perfection may supervene would be related to animal as a component part, and not as implicitly contained in the notion of animal; and in this way animal would not be a genus. But animal is a genus in that it signifies a certain thing from the form of which sensation and motion can proceed, whatever this form may be, whether a sensible soul only, or a soul both sensible and rational.

Sic ergo genus significat indeterminate totum id quod est in specie, non enim significat tantum materiam; similiter etiam differentia significat totum et non significat tantum formam; et etiam diffinitio significat totum, et etiam species. Sed tamen diversimode, quia genus significat totum ut quedam denominatio determinans id quod est materiale in re sine determinatione proprie forme. Unde genus sumitur ex materia, quamvis non sit materia, ut patet quod corpus dicitur ex hoc quod habet talem perfectionem, ut possint in eo designari tres dimensiones; que quidem perfectio est materialiter se habens ad ulteriorem perfectionem. Differentia vero e converso est sicut quedam denominatio a forma determinate sumpta preter hoc quod de primo intellectu eius sit materia determinata, ut patet, cum dicitur animatum, scilicet illud quod habet animam; non enim determinatur quid sit, utrum corpus vel aliquid aliud. Unde dicit Avicenna quod genus non intelligitur in differentia sicut pars essentie eius, sed solum sicut ens extra essentiam, sicut etiam subiectum est de intellectu passionum. Et ideo etiam genus non predicatur de differentia per se loquendo, ut dicit philosophus in III Metaphysice et in iv topicorum, nisi forte sicut subiectum predicatur de passione. Sed diffinitio vel species comprehendit utrumque, scilicet determinatam materiam, quam designat nomen generis, et determinatam formam, quam designat nomen differentie.

Therefore, the genus signifies indeterminately the whole that is in the species and does not signify matter alone. Similarly, the difference also signifies the whole and does not signify the form alone, and the definition, or even the species, signifies the whole. But these nevertheless signify the same thing in different ways. For the genus signifies the whole as a certain denomination determining that which is material in the thing without a determination of its proper form, whence the genus is taken from the matter, although it is not the matter. This is clear in the case of bodies, as we call something a body in that the thing has a perfection such that in the thing three dimensions can be designated, and this perfection is related materially to some further perfection. Conversely, the difference is like a certain denomination taken from the determined form, beyond the first conception of the form by which the matter is determined. So, when we say something is animated (that, in other words, it has a soul), this does not determine what the thing is, whether it is a body or some other thing. Hence, Avicenna says, Metaphysicae V, cap. 6, that the genus is not understood in the difference as a part of its essence but only as a being beyond its essence, even as a subject is with respect to the concept of a passion. And thus the genus is not predicated per se of the difference, as the Philosopher says in III Metaphysicae cap. 8 (998b24) and in IV Topicorum cap. 2 (122b22-26), unless perhaps as a subject is predicated of a passion. But the definition or the species comprehends both, namely, the determined matter that the term genus designates and the determined form that the term difference designates.

Ex hoc patet ratio quare genus, species et differentia se habent proportionaliter ad materiam et formam et compositum in natura, quamvis non sint idem quod illa, quia neque genus est materia, sed a materia sumptum ut significans totum, neque differentia forma, sed a forma sumpta ut significans totum. Unde dicimus hominem esse animal rationale et non ex animali et rationali, sicut dicimus eum esse ex anima et corpore. Ex anima enim et corpore dicitur esse homo, sicut ex duabus rebus quedam res tertia constituta, que neutra illarum est. Homo enim neque est anima neque corpus. Sed si homo aliquo modo ex animali et rationali esse dicatur, non erit sicut res tertia ex duabus rebus, sed sicut intellectus tertius ex duobus intellectibus. Intellectus enim animalis est sine determinatione specialis forme, exprimens naturam rei ab eo quod est materiale respectu ultime perfectionis. Intellectus autem huius differentie rationalis consistit in determinatione forme specialis. Ex quibus duobus intellectibus constituitur intellectus speciei vel diffinitionis. Et ideo sicut res constituta ex aliquibus non recipit predicationem earum rerum, ex quibus constituitur, ita nec intellectus recipit predicationem eorum intellectuum, ex quibus constituitur. Non enim dicimus quod diffinitio sit genus aut differentia.

From this is it clear why the genus, the difference, and the species are related proportionally to the matter, the form, and the composite in nature, although they are not the same as these things. For, the genus is not the matter, though it is taken from the matter as signifying the whole; nor is the difference the form, though it is taken from the form as signifying the whole. Thus we say that man is a rational animal, but not composed of the animal and the rational in the sense that we say that man is composed of soul and body: man is said to be composed of soul and body as from two things from which a third thing is constituted different from each of the two. Man, surely, is neither body nor soul. But if man is said in some sense to be composed of the animal and the rational, it will not be as a third thing composed from these two things, but as a third concept composed from these two concepts. The concept of animal is without determination of a special form and expresses, with respect to the ultimate perfection, the nature of the thing from that which is material; the concept of the difference, rational, consists in the determination of the special form. From these two concepts are constituted the concept of the species or the definition. Thus, just as a thing constituted from other things does not have predicated of it these other things, so too a concept does not have predicated of it the concepts of which it is constituted: clearly, we do not say that the definition is either the genus or the difference.

Quamvis autem genus significet totam essentiam speciei, non tamen oportet ut diversarum specierum, quarum est idem genus, sit una essentia, quia unitas generis ex ipsa indeterminatione vel indifferentia procedit, non autem ita, quod illud quod significatur per genus sit una natura numero in diversis speciebus, cui superveniat res alia, que sit differentia determinans ipsum, sicut forma determinat materiam, que est una numero, sed quia genus significat aliquam formam, non tamen determinate hanc vel illam, quam determinate differentia exprimit, que non est alia quam illa, que indeterminate significabatur per genus. Et ideo dicit commentator in XI Metaphysice quod materia prima dicitur una per remotionem omnium formarum, sed genus dicitur unum per communitatem forme significate. Unde patet quod per additionem differentie remota illa indeterminatione, que erat causa unitatis generis, remanent species per essentiam diverse.

Although the genus may signify the whole essence of the species, nevertheless there is not just one essence of the various species under one genus, for the unity of the genus proceeds from its very indetermination or undifferentiation. Nor is it the case that what is signified through the genus is numerically one nature in the various species such that to it there supervenes some other thing, which is the difference that determines it, as a form determines matter, which is numerically one. Rather, the genus signifies some form (though not determinately this one or that one), which the difference expresses determinately, the very one that is signified indeterminately through the genus. And thus the Commentator says in Metaphysicae XII, [[4]] com. 14, that prime matter is called one by the removal of all forms, but the genus is called one through the commonality of forms signified. Hence, the indetermination, which was the cause of the unity of the genus, having been removed through the addition of the difference, the species remain essentially diverse.

Et quia, ut dictum est, natura speciei est indeterminata respectu individui sicut natura generis respectu speciei, inde est quod sicut id quod est genus, prout predicabatur de specie, implicabat in sua significatione, quamvis indistincte, totum quod determinate est in specie, ita etiam et id quod est species, secundum quod predicatur de individuo, oportet quod significet totum id quod est essentialiter in individuo, licet indistincte. Et hoc modo essentia speciei significatur nomine hominis, unde homo de socrate predicatur. Si autem significetur natura speciei cum precisione materie designate, que est principium individuationis, sic se habebit per modum partis. Et hoc modo significatur nomine humanitatis; humanitas enim significat id unde homo est homo. Materia autem designata non est id unde homo est homo; et ita nullo modo continetur inter illa, ex quibus homo habet quod sit homo. Cum ergo humanitas in suo intellectu includat tantum ea, ex quibus homo habet quod sit homo, patet quod a significatione eius excluditur vel preciditur materia designata. Et quia pars non predicatur de toto, inde est quod humanitas nec de homine nec de socrate predicatur. Unde dicit Avicenna quod quiditas compositi non est ipsum compositum, cuius est quiditas, quamvis etiam ipsa quiditas sit composita, sicut humanitas, licetsit composita, non est homo, immo oportet quod sit recepta in aliquo quod est materia designata.

Furthermore, since, as said above, the nature of the species is indeterminate with respect to the individual just as the nature of the genus is with respect to the species, and since, further, the genus, as predicated of the species, includes in its signification (although indistinctly) everything that is in the species determinately, so too does the species, as predicated of the individual, signify everything that is in the individual essentially, although it signifies this indistinctly. In this way, the essence of the species is signified by the term man, and so man is predicated of Socrates. If, however, the nature of the species is signified in such a way as to exclude designate matter, which is the principle of individuation, then the species is related to the individual as a part; and this is how the term humanity signifies, for humanity signifies that by which a man is a man. Designate matter, however, is not that by which a man is a man, and it is in no way contained among those things that make a man a man. Since, therefore, the concept of humanity includes only those things by which a man is a man, designate matter is excluded or pretermitted, and since a part is not predicated of its whole, humanity is predicated neither of man nor of Socrates. Thus Avicenna says, Metaphysicae V, cap. 5, that the quiddity of a composite thing is not the composite thing of which it is the quiddity, even though the quiddity itself is composite, as humanity, while composite, is not man. On the contrary, it must be received in something that is designate matter.

Sed quia, ut dictum est, designatio speciei respectu generis est per formam, designatio autem individui respectu speciei est per materiam, ideo oportet ut nomen significans id, unde natura generis sumitur, cum precisione forme determinate perficientis speciem significet partem materialem totius, sicut corpus est pars materialis hominis. Nomen autem significans id, unde sumitur natura speciei cum precisione materie designate, significat partem formalem. Et ideo humanitas significatur ut forma quedam, et dicitur quod est forma totius, non quidem quasi superaddita partibus essentialibus, scilicet forme et materie, sicut forma domus superadditur partibus integralibus eius, sed magis est forma, que est totum scilicet formam complectens et materiam, tamen cum precisione eorum, per que nata est materia designari.

But since, as said above, the designation of the species with respect to the genus is through the form, and the designation of the individual with respect to the species is through matter, the term signifying that from which the nature of the genus is taken thus excludes the determinate form that completes the species and signifies the material part of the whole, as the body is the material part of the man. However, the term signifying that from which the nature of the species is taken, excluding designate matter, signifies the formal part. Thus, humanity is signified as a certain form, and it is said that it is the form of the whole, not, certainly, as a form superadded to the essential parts (the form and the matter), but rather as the form of a house is superadded to its integral parts; and that is better called the form which is the whole, in other words, that which embraces the form and the matter, albeit excluding those things through which the designatability of matter arises.

Sic igitur patet quod essentiam hominis significat hoc nomen homo et hoc nomen humanitas, sed diversimode, ut dictum est, quia hoc nomen homo significat eam ut totum, in quantum scilicet non precidit designationem materie, sed implicite, continet eam et indistincte, sicut dictum est quod genus continet differentiam; et ideo predicatur hoc nomen homo de individuis. Sed hoc nomen humanitas significat eam ut partem, quia non continet in significatione sua nisi id, quod est hominis in quantum est homo, et precidit omnem designationem. Unde de individuis hominis non predicatur. Et propter hoc etiam nomen essentie quandoque invenitur predicatum in re, dicimus enim socratem esse essentiam quandam; et quandoque negatur, sicut dicimus quod essentia socratis non est socrates.

Therefore, the term man and the term humanity both signify the essence of man, though in diverse ways, as said above. The term man signifies the essence as a whole, in other words, insofar as the essence does not exclude designation of matter but implicitly and indistinctly contains it, in the way in which we said that the genus contains the difference. Hence, the term man is predicated of individuals. But the term humanity signifies the essence of man as a part because it contains in its signification only what belongs to man insofar as he is man, and it excludes all designation, and so it is not predicated of individual men. And for this reason the term essence is sometimes found predicated of the thing, as when we say that Socrates is a certain essence; and sometimes the term essence is denied of the thing, as when we say that the essence of Socrates is not Socrates.

Note on English translation: This translation follows the Leonine Edition of Aquinas' works, vol. 43 Sancti Thomae De Aquino Opera Omnia 368-381 (Rome 1976). Translation © 1997 by Robert T. Miller. All persons are licensed to reproduce this translation and the footnotes hereto for personal or educational purposes, provided that the notice of copyright set forth above and this notice are included in their respective entireties in all copies. This license includes reproduction by a commercial entity engaged in the business of providing copying services if such reproduction is made pursuant to an agreement the other party to which would be licensed under the preceding sentence to reproduce this translation for personal or educational purposes.

 

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