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The 24 theses of Pope Pius X

[Decree of the Sacred Congregation of Studies, 27 July 1914]

Contents

Introductory

The origin of the theses

The theses

1 Potency and act
2 Act is limited only by potency
3 Essence and existence
4 The meaning of 'being'
5 Substance and accident
6 Relationship is an accident
7 Simplicity of spiritual creatures
8 Corporeal creatures comprise matter and form
9 Matter and form do not exist independently
10 Corporeal substance, as such, is not extended
11 Matter accounts for the multiplicity of identical individuals
12 Quantity and place
13 Living and non-living bodies
14 Vegetable and animal souls
15 The human soul
16 Human soul and body
17 Human faculties
18 Intellect is immaterial
19 Active intellect
20 Varieties of human knowledge
21 Desire follows knowledge
22 We can prove god exists
23 God is benevolent
24 God is creator and cause of all

Commentary

A short history

The origin of the theses

[The following paragraphs are a translation of the preamble to ss 3601-3624 in Denzinger and Schoenmetzer]

In his Motu Proprio 'Doctoris Angelici' of 29 June, 1914, Pope Pius X advised the Italian schools of Philosophy that the principles and major opinions of Thomas Aquinas should be held conscientiously.

The Thomists responded to this announcement by proposing twenty four theses representing their metaphyscial position to the Sacred Congregation for Studies 'for examination'.

Others saw that if these theses, if officially approved and promulgated, might be forced upon the less Thomistically inclined schools of thought against their will, and destroy their freedom to hold diverse opinions.

Moved by this difference of opinion, the Congregation declared, on 7 March 1916 that All these twenty four philosophical theses express the genuine teaching of St Thomas, and they are put forward as safe directive norms [tutae normae directivae ] (Acta Apostolicae Sedis 8 [1916] 157).

They do not therefore impose an absolute obligation. Thus the requirement that philosophers follow Saint Thomas does not mean that a person must adopt Thomas's teachings in their entirety. The broader sense in which these 'directive norms' are to be understood is best expressed in Benedict XV's letter Quod de fovenda (19 March, 1917) to Wlodimir Ledochowski, General of the Society of Jesus (Acta Romana S. I, 9 [1917] 318s);

Neque minus iucunde animadvertimus aequa te lance rationum momenta perpendisse, quibus quemadmodum oporteat a S Thomae doctrinis esse, hinc inde disceptando contenditur.

Quo quidem in iudicio recte Nos te sensisse arbitramur, quum eos putasti Angelico Doctori satis adhaerere, qui universas de Thomae doctrina theses perinde proponenda censeant, ac tutas ad dirigendum normas, nullo scilicet omnium amplectendarum thesium imposito officio.

Eiusmodi spectantes regulam, possunt Societatis alumni iure timorem deponere, ne eo quo par est obsequio iussa non prosequantur Rom. Pontificum, quorum ea constans sententia fuit, ducem ac magistrum in theologiae et philosophiae studiis S Thomam haberi opus esse, integro tamen cuique de iis in utramque partem disputate, de quibus possit soleatque disputari.

We are just as pleased to notice that you are acutely and carefully considering the equally important questions, recently raised, of the degree to which it is necessary to adhere to the teachings of Saint Thomas.

We are of the opinion that those who accept the universal theses of the Angelic Doctor's teaching as safe norms for guidance have done what is required without it being necessary to follow Thomas in every detail.

Looking at things this way, members of the Society may rightfully put aside the fear that this degree of compliance fails to meet the prescriptions of the Roman Pontiffs, whose constant opinion has been that it is a duty to hold Saint Thomas as leader and master in studies of philosophy and theology, while remaining free to argue for various positions on open questions.

[Note: I have difficulty with this sort of Latin. My confidence in the above translation is low. I would appreciate your corrections and improvements].

The importance of the theses was reaffirmed by Pius XI and Pius XII.

Thomas Aquinas remains the central intellectual figure in the Roman Cathlic elaboration of Christian belief. The new Code of Canon Law, published in 1983, continues to emphasise the importance of St Thomas.

Canon 252 3. Lectures are to be given in dogmatic theology, based always on the written word of God and on sacred Tradition; through, them the students are to learn to penetrate more deeply into the mysteries of salvation, with St Thomas in particular as their teacher. ... [Canon Law Society of Great Britain and Ireland The Code of Canon Law in English Translation, Collins 1983]. (Back)

The twenty four theses

The translation given here is my own. It might be a bit off and reflect my misunderstandings, but I have done my best. I have never seen an official translation, but would like to hear if one exists.

[The headings in square brackets are not part of the original text]

[Potency and act]

1 Potentia et actus ita dividunt ens, ut quidquid est, vel sit actus purus, vel ex potentia et actus tamquam primis atque intrinsecis principiis necessario coelescat.

Being may be modelled using potency and act in such a way that whatever exists is either pure act, or a union of potency and act as primary and intrinsic principles. back

[Act is limited only by potency]

2 Actus, utpote perfectio, non limitatur nisi per potentiam, quae est capacitas perfectionis. Proinde in quo ordine actus est purus, in eodem nonnisi illimitatus et unicus existit. Ubi vero est finitus ac multiplex, in veram incidit cum potentia compositionem.

Act, since it is perfection, is not limited except by potency, which is the capacity for perfection. It follows that in the regime where act is pure, act can only be infinite and unique. Where act is finite and multiple, it it found in a true composite with potency. back

[Essence and existence]

3 Quapropter in absoluta ipsius esse ratione unus subsistit Deus, unus est simplicissimus, cetera cuncta quae ipsum esse participant, naturam habent qua esse coarctatur, ac tamquam distinctis realiter principiis, essentia et esse constant.

Since God alone, one and most simple, subsists in the absolute fullness of being itself, all the other things which participate in being have a nature by which their being is constrained; thus they are compounded of essence and existence as from really distinct principles. back

[The meaning of 'being']

4 Ens quod denominatur ab esse, non univoce de Deo ac de creaturis dicitur, nec tamen prorsus aequivoce, sed analogice, analogia tum attributionis tum proportionalitas.

Being, which is named from the verb 'to be', is not said of god and of creatures in exactly the same sense.The meanings of being are not, nevertheless, completely different, but are analogous,the analogy being both of attribution and of proportion. back

[Substance and accident]

5 Est praetera in omni creatura realis compositio subiecti subsistentis cum formis secondario additis, sive accidentibus: ea vero, nisi esse realiter in essentia distincta reciperetur, intelligi non posset.

Further, there is in every creature a real composition of a subsistent subject and forms added secondarily, known as accidents: Indeed, accidents make no sense unless they are understood to exist attached to an essentially distinct entity. back

[Relationship is an accident]

6 Praeter absoluta accidentia est etiam relativum, sive ad aliquid Quamvis enim ad aliquid non significet secundum propriam rationem aliquid alicui inhaerens, saepe tamen causam in rebus habet, et ideo realem entitatem distinctam a subjecto.

In addition to absolute accidents there is also the relative, or relationship to something. Although relationship to something does not of itself imply anything inherent in an object, nevertheless it often has a basis in fact, and is therefore a real entity distinct from its subject. back

[Simplicity of spiritual creatures]

7 Creatura spiritualis est in sua essentia omnino simplex. Sed remanet in ea compostio duplex: essentiae cum esse et substantia cum accidentibus.

The essense of a spiritual creature is completely simple. There is still, however, a twofold composition in spiritual creatures: that of essense with existence, and that of substance with accidents. back

[Corporeal creatures comprise matter and form]

8 Creatura vero corporalis est quoad ipsam essentiam composita potentia et actu; quae potentia et actus ordinis essentiae, materiae et formae nominibus designantur.

Even the essence of corporeal creatures is composite, comprising potency and act. Potency and act in the essence of corporeal creatures are called matter and form. back

[Matter and form do not exist independently]

9 Earum partium neutra per se esse habet, nec per se producitur vel corrumpitur, nec ponitur in praedicamento nisi reductive ut principium substantiale.

Neither of these components of corporeal creatures has being of itself; nor are they produced or destroyed in their own right; nor can they predicated of anything except by understanding them to be terms referring to substance. back

[Corporeal substance, as such, is not extended]

10 Etsi corpoream naturam extensio in partes integrales consequitur, non tamen idem est corpori esse substantiam et esse quantum. Substantia quippe ratione sui indivisibilis est, non quidem ad modum puncti, sed ad modum eius quod est extra ordinem dimensionis. Quantitas vero, quae extensionem substantia tribuit, a substantia realiter differt, et est veri nominis accidens.

Even though extension into integral parts follows from corporeal nature, it is nevertheless not the same thing for a body to be a substance and to be quantified. For substance, of its nature, is indivisible, not in the way that a point is indivisible, but as something entirely out of the realm of spatial dimension. Quantity, which gives spatial extension to a substance, is really different from substance and is properly called an accident back

[Matter accounts for the multiplicity of identical individuals]

11 Quantitate signata materia principium est individuationis, id est numericae distinctionis, quae in puris spiritibus esse non potest, unius individui ab alio in eadem natura specifica.

Matter, indicated by quantity, is the principle of individuation, that is of numerical distinction. Numerical distinction of specifically identical individuals is not possible in pure spirits. back

[Quantity and place]

12 Eadem efficitur quantitate, ut corpus circumscriptive sit in loco, et in uno tantum loco de quacumque potentia per hunc modum esse possit.

It is quantity also that makes it so that a body may be bounded by a place, and that it may be in just one place at a time although it has the potency to be in many different places. back

[Living and non-living bodies]

13 Corpora dividuntur bifariam: quaedam enim sunt viventia, quaedam expertia vitae. In viventibus, ut in eodem subjecto pars movens et pars mota per se habeantur, forma substantialis, animae nomine designata, requirit organicam dispositionem seu partes heterogeneas.

Bodies are divided into two classes: some are living; some are without life. The substantial form of a living thing, called the soul, requires an organic structure of distinctive parts so that both a part that moves and a part that is moved may coexist. back

[Vegetable and animal souls]

14 Vegetalis et sensilis ordinis animae nequaquam per se subsistunt, nec per se producuntur, sed sunt tantummodo ut principium quo vivens est et vivit, et cum a materia se totis dependeant, corrupto composito, eo ipso per accidens corrumpuntur.

Souls of the vegetative and sensitive order can never exist of themselves, nor are they created in their own right, but only as the principle by which the living thing exists and lives. Since vegetative and sensitive souls are completely dependent on matter, their destruction is a consequence of the destruction of the body/soul composite. back

[The human soul]

15 Contra, per se subsistit anima humana, quae, cum subjecto sufficienter disposito potest infundi, a Deo creatur, et sua natura incorruptibilis est atque immortalis.

On the other hand, the human soul exists in its own right (per se). When there is a sufficiently organised subject for it to enter, it is created by God, and is by its nature incorruptible and immortal. back

[Human soul and body]

16 Eadem anima rationalis ita unitur corpori, ut sit eiusdem forma substantialis unica, et per ipsam habet homo ut sit homo et animal et vivens et corpus et substantia et ens. Tribuit igitur anima homini omnem gradum perfectionis essentialem; insuper communicat corpori actum essendi, quo ipsa est.

This rational human soul is united to the body is such a way that it is its unique substantial form, through which a human being is endowed with humanity, animal nature, life, body, substance and being. The human soul contributes every essential degree of perfection, and in addition gives to the body the act of existence, by which it is. back

[Human faculties]

17 Duplicis ordinis facultates, organicae et inorganicae, ex anima human per naturalem resultantiam emanant: priores, ad quas sensus pertinet, in composito subjectantur, posteriores in anima sola. Est igitur intellectus facultas ab organo intrinsece independens.

Faculties of two orders, those with physical organs and those without, flow from the human soul by nature. The former order, which includes the senses, are subjected to composition with matter. The latter exist in the soul alone. The intellect is therefore a faculty naturally independent of any organ. back

[Intellect is immaterial]

18 Immaterialitatem necessario sequitur intellectualitas, et ita quidem, ut secundum gradus elongationis a materia sint quoque gradus intellectualitatis. Adaequatum intellectionis obiectum est communiter ipsum ens; proprium vero intellectus humani in praesenti statu unionis, quidditatibus abstractis a condicionibus materialibus continetur.

Immateriality is a necessary consequence of intellect, and the level of intellect is measured by its distance from matter. In general, the proper object of intellect is being itself; the proper object of the human intellect in the present state of union with the body is the essences of things abstracted from their relationship to matter. back

[Active intellect]

19 Cognitionem ergo accipimus a rebus sensibilibus. Cum autem sensibile non sit intelligibile in actu, praeter intellectum formaliter intelligentem admittenda est in anima virtus activa, quae species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus abstrahat.

Knowledge comes to us from sensible things. Since something sensible is not actually intelligible, we must admit the existence of an active power in the soul which abstracts intelligible species from the images generated by sensation. back

[Varieties of human knowledge]

20 Per has species directe universalia cognoscimus; singularia sensu attingimus, tum etiam intellectu per conversionem ad phantasmata; ad cognitionem vero spiritualium per analogiam ascendimus.

We know universals directly through these intelligible species. Singular objects are reached through sensation, and understood intellectually by considering sensual images; we rise to the understanding of spiritual beings by analogy. back

[Desire follows knowledge]

21 Intellectum sequitur, non praecedit, voluntas, quae necessario appetit id quod sibi praesentatur tamquam bonum ex omni parte explens appetitum, sed inter plura bona, quae iudicio mutabili appetenda proponuntur, libere elegit. Sequitur proinde electio iudicium practicum ultimum; at quod sit ultimum, voluntas afficit.

Will follows rather than precedes intellect. The will necessarily desires that which is presented to it as a good filling every aspect of desire; but when presented with many goods which are judged to be of varying desirability, it chooses freely. Choice therefore follows the final practical judgement, but it is the will that decides that a particular judgement is to be final. back

[We can prove that God exists]

22 Deum esse neque immediata intuitione percipimus, neque a priori demonstramus, sed utique a posteriori, hoc est, per ea quae facta sunt, ducto argumento ab effectibus ad causam: videlicet, a rebus quae moventur et sui motus principium adaequatum esse non possunt, ad primum motorem immobilem; a processu rerum mundanarum e causis inter se subordinatis ad primam causam incausatam; a corruptibilibus quae aequaliter se habent ad esse et non esse, ad ens absolute necessarium; ab iis quae secundum minoratas perfectiones essendi, vivendi, intelligendi, plus et minus sunt, vivunt, intelligunt, ad eum qui est maxime intelligens, maxime vivens, maxime ens; denique, ab ordine universi ad intellectum separatum, qui res ordinavit, disposuit, et dirigit ad finem.

We neither perceive the existence of god through immediate intuition, nor can we demonstrate his existence a priori,but we can certainly demonstrate his existence a posteriori,that is through created things,led by the argument from effects to cause. For example: from those things which move and cannot explain their own motion to a first unmoving mover; from corruptible things, which might equally exist or not exist, to a being which cannot not exist; from those things which having lesser perfections of being, living and understanding, are, live and understand more and less to one who is maximally intelligent, maximally living and maximally being; and finally from the order of the universe to a separate intellect which orders, disposes and rules things according to a purpose. back

[God is benevolent]

23 Divini essentia, per hoc quod exercitae actualitati ipsius esse identificatur, seu per hoc quod est ipsum Esse subsistens, in sua veluti metaphysica ratione bene nobis constituata proponitur, et per hoc idem rationem nobis exhibet suae infinitatis in perfectione.

The divine essence, insofar as it is identified with the actual exercise of being itself, or insofar as it is subsistent Being itself, is of its very metaphysical nature well disposed toward us, and for this same reason exhibits its infinite perfection to us. back

[God is creator and cause of all]

24 Ipsa igitur puritate sui esse , a finitis omnibus rebus secernitur Deus. Inde infertur primo, mundum nonnisi per creationem a Deo procedere potuisse; deinde virtutem creativem, qua per se primo attingitur ens in quantum ens, nec miraculose ulli finitae naturae esse communicabilem; nullum denique creatum agens in esse cuiuscumque effectus influere, nisi motione accepta a prima Causa.

God is therefore distinguished from all finite things by the purity of his being. From this can be deduced first, that the world could have come into existence only by creation by God; secondly that the creative power, whose primary role is to establish being as being, cannot be miraculously communicated to any finite nature; and finally that nothing created is capable of making anything happen except through motion received from the first Cause. back

Commentary

I cannot imagine anyone thinking that these theses capture the full richness of Aquinas' philosophical model of reality. They serve instead as a checklist of orthodoxy and a very convenient starting point for one who wishes to make radical criticisms of the Catholic position.

To find out what they mean one must study Thomas's writings, his sources and his commentators. My own understanding of Thomas was greatly enhanced by reading Insight: A Study of Human Understanding by Bernard Lonergan

As this site grows, I hope to develop a commentary on each of these theses, explaining how it might be reinterpreted in the framework of this site. Links to these commentaries will appear here when they are ready. back

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