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De ente et essentia

Chapter 1

Sciendum est igitur quod, sicut in V Metaphysice Philosophus dicit, ens per se dicitur dupliciter, uno modo quod dividitur per decem genera, alio modo quod significat propositionum veritatem. Horum autem differentia est quia secundo modo potest dici ens omne illud, de quo affirmativa propositio formari potest, etiam si illud in re nihil ponat. Per quem modum privationes et negationes entia dicuntur; dicimus enim quod affirmatio est opposita negationi et quod cecitas est in oculo. Sed primo modo non potest dici ens nisi quod aliquid in re ponit. Unde primo modo cecitas et huiusmodi non sunt entia.

Therefore it must be understood, as the Philosopher says in book 5 chapter 7 of the Metaphysics, (1017a22-35) that the term being has two meanings; the first meaning is being as divided into the ten genera. Aristotle. The other use of the term means the truth of propositions. These two meanings differ because following the second we can call anything a being about which we can for an affirmative proposition, even though this proposition points to nothing in reality. In this way we call privations and negations beings; for we say things like affirmation is the opposite to negation, and that blindness is in the eye. Using the first meaning, only those things which point to something in reality may be called being. By the first meaning, blindness and things like it are not beings.

Nomen igitur essentie non sumitur ab ente secundo modo dicto, aliqua enim hoc modo dicuntur entia, que essentiam non habent, ut patet in privationibus; sed sumitur essentia ab ente primo modo dicto. Unde commentator in eodem loco dicit quod ens primo modo dictum est quod significat essentiam rei. Et quia, ut dictum est, ens hoc modo dictum dividitur per decem genera, oportet quod essentia significet aliquid commune omnibus naturis, per quas diversa entia in diversis generibus et speciebus collocantur, sicut humanitas est essentia hominis, et sic de aliis.

The term essence is not derived from the second meaning of being, since acording to this meaning some things are called beings which have no essence, as is obvious for privations. Instead we take essence from being understood in the second way. Hence the commentator writing on this passage notes that being according to the first meaning points to the essence of a thing. And because, as I have noted, this form of being is divided into ten genera, essence must mean something which is common to all natures through which different beings are allocated to different genera and species, thus humanity is the essence of man, and so on.

Et quia illud, per quod res constituitur in proprio genere vel specie, est hoc quod significatur per diffinitionem indicantem quid est res, inde est quod nomen essentie a philosophis in nomen quiditatis mutatur. Et hoc est quod Philosophus frequenter nominat quod quid erat esse, id est hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid. Dicitur etiam forma secundum quod per formam significatur certitudo uniuscuiusque rei, ut dicit Avicenna in II Metaphysice sue. Hoc etiam alio nomine natura dicitur accipiendo naturam secundum primum modum illorum quattuor, quos Boethius in libro de duabus naturis assignat, secundum scilicet quod natura dicitur omne illud quod intellectu quoquo modo capi potest. Non enim res est intelligibilis nisi per diffinitionem et essentiam suam. Et sic etiam Philosophus dicit in V Metaphysice quod omnis substantia est natura. Tamen nomen nature hoc modo sumpte videtur significare essentiam rei, secundum quod habet ordinem ad propriam operationem rei, cum nulla res propria operatione destituatur. Quiditatis vero nomen sumitur ex hoc, quod per diffinitionem significatur. Sed essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse.

And since that property through which a thing is allocated to its proper genus or species is what we mean by the definition showing us what the thing is, the Philosopher has sometimes substituted the word quiddity for the word essence. This is what the Philosopher frequently called 'that which was to be', that is that through which something comes to be a certain thing. Essence is also called form, insofar as form points to the certainty of each particular thing, as Avicenna points out in book II of his Metaphysics. Morewedge. The term nature is also used for essence, taking nature in the first of the four senses delineated by Boethius in his book on The Two natures, ie that nature means all that which can be captured in any way by the intellect. For a thing cannot be understood except through its essence and definition. So the Philosopher says in book V of the Metaphysics that every substance is a nature. Aristotle. For the term nature taken in this way appears to mean the essence of a thing, insofar as it is the source of the the proper operation of a thing, since nothing is without a proper operation. The term quiddity points to that which is meant by the definition of a thing. But essence is understood as that through which and in which a thing has its being.

Sed quia ens absolute et per prius dicitur de substantiis et per posterius et quasi secundum quid de accidentibus, inde est quod essentia proprie et vere est in substantiis, sed in accidentibus est quodammodo et secundum quid. Substantiarum vero quedam sunt simplices et quedam composite, et in utrisque est essentia, sed in simplicibus veriori et nobiliori modo, secundum quod etiam esse nobilius habent. Sunt enim causa eorum que composita sunt, ad minus substantia prima simplex, que deus est. Sed quia illarum substantiarum essentie sunt nobis magis occulte, ideo ab essentiis substantiarum compositarum incipiendum est, ut a facilioribus convenientior fiat disciplina.

Because the term being applies absolutely and primarily to substances and secondarily and in a qualified way to accidents, it follows that the essence is properly and truly to be found substances, and in a certain restricted way in accidents. Substances may be either simple or composite. Essence is to be found in both, but in a truer and nobler manner in simple things, which also have being in a nobler manner. For simple things are the cause of the complex, at least in the case of the first simplicity, which is God. But because the essences of simple things are more hidden from us, we must begin with the essences of composite things, since it is better to learn from easier examples.

Note on English translation: This translation follows the Leonine Edition of Aquinas' works, vol. 43 Sancti Thomae De Aquino Opera Omnia 368-381 (Rome 1976). Translation © 1997 by Robert T. Miller. All persons are licensed to reproduce this translation and the footnotes hereto for personal or educational purposes, provided that the notice of copyright set forth above and this notice are included in their respective entireties in all copies. This license includes reproduction by a commercial entity engaged in the business of providing copying services if such reproduction is made pursuant to an agreement the other party to which would be licensed under the preceding sentence to reproduce this translation for personal or educational purposes.

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